OBJECTION

TO

GLASGOW AIRPORT RAIL LINK BILL
(SP BILL 54)

SUBMITTED

BY

S A D D

STRATHclyders

AGAINST

DETRIMENTAL

DEVELOPMENT
We, Strathclyders Against Detrimental Development (SADD) wish to object to the whole of the above bill promoted by Strathclyde Passenger Transport on the following grounds.

i) The viaduct and bridge will be visually intrusive.

ii) The open outlook and ethos of the St James’ Park will be lost.

iii) The noise and light pollution caused by the train on the viaduct, with the rail height at 9.4 metres will be virtually impossible to mitigate and will prove to be intolerable over the proposed timetable which will extend for over 18 hours a day, every day.

iv) There will be a detrimental effect on the value of the adjacent properties.

v) There will be irreparable damage to the historical culture of Paisley

vi) There will be no material benefit to the surrounding area in terms of better transportation or easier access to the airport within a radius of 5 miles of the terminal.

vii) As there will always be a requirement of a massive annual subsidy there is no economically favourable argument that can justify this rail link, especially when the projected paucity of passenger numbers is taken into account.

viii) The economic disruption to the local area during the period of construction along with the crossing of the M8 has not been quantified.

ix) With the lack of car parking facilities at Paisley Gilmour Street Station, no one in the Paisley area would want to or could use this service to the airport, when they can drive to and park at the terminal.

All of the detailed content of the objection below is drawn from reading, in detail, the Faber Maunsell Stage 3 report along with the Appendices and SPT publicity leaflet ‘where next’.

GENERAL

1 a) The GARL fails to comply with the planning objectives as set out by SKM (Sinclair Knight & Mertz) and agreed with the steering group as stated in SKM report Phase 4 Page 145 - 8.5.1 (Appendix A)

b) The GARL does not qualify for acceptance under the same report page 146, paragraphs 683, 684, 687 and 688.

c) The GARL option and associated passenger number projections are not expected to better the percentages given on page 146, paragraph 689 of the SKM report.
2 The Faber Maunsell Stage 3 report offers no information that would alter the modal percentage of transport used by passengers stated by the BAA in their outline Master Plan for Glasgow Airport issued in July 2005, for the year 2004 and projected for the next 15 years.

In the BAA study - Glasgow Airport outline Master Plan issued for consultation in July 2005 - Table 10 makes no mention of any rail link impact or a projection. However the report states on page 28 - 7.2.6 that the only percentage improvement over the time span used is in the use of current public transport, ie, buses from 11% to 12%.

On the same page 28 of the report under RAIL, the link only merits the word ‘may’ in terms of a service to deliver airport growth.

3 So many derogations* are required for this option to make it work that the validity of the construction must be severely questioned.

4 It has been assumed that permission will be granted to make extreme modifications to Glasgow Central Station “Grade A” listed Building which will in turn only exacerbate the problems of the project further.

Reference - Faber Maunsell Stage 3 Report

5 Main Report page 60 - 7.4.3 Circulation and Access

a) “Creation of a car free environment within the western rail shed” is, again, detrimental to disabled passengers.

b) Main Report page 130- 13.6 Glasgow Central Station

“Initial discussions between SPT and NCP have indicated that it would be possible to replace the 3 disabled parking spaces within the Oswald Street Car Park”.

This means that disabled drivers/passengers will have a much greater distance to travel to access the platforms from a multi storied car park irrespective of their ability, or not, to walk.

6 Soil and Ground Surveys

a) Renfrewshire Council have given permission for a total of 5 boreholes to be made in St James’ Park, but the SPT only carried out one at the south side of the park with 2 others, one carried out at the north side of the M8 and the other at Clark Street. Surely such an important project merits a more detailed exploration particularly as the route is over bog land.

b) There is no reference in the Stage 3 Report under key decisions to utilise the borehole information from the British Geological Survey website, which includes several hundred boreholes carried out in the surrounding area.

* The dictionary definition of derogation states “to deviate in standard: to curtail the application of a law: debase or degrade.”
CONTRADICTIONS

This Stage 3 report is an arrogant, contradictory document which appears to have as it’s main objectives the “pulling the wool” over everyone’s eyes, to blind everyone with engineering and scientific terms and to show no regard whatsoever for accuracy or accountability. At the very least, this is not very complimentary to the Scottish Parliament.

Some of the text quoted from Faber Maunsell Stage 3 report has been highlighted in red for emphasis and merits careful attention.

7 Appendix 1 ADB Item 6.0 Platforms

“Each platform will have a maximum gradient of 1:500”

With the Airport Station platform height and slope and the height of the M8 crossing already set, this will impact on the height of the bridge elevation crossing the M8. There is a dangerous discrepancy in the calculation.

8 Main Report page 111 - 12.6.3.3 Benefits

The reliability for rail users has only been assessed between Paisley Gilmour Street and Glasgow Central. If a major part of this project is the spur to the Airport, surely this should also have been included. Why comment on timetable robustness, signalling and train usage at the airport. This statement is in contradiction with the whole content of the Stage 3 report.

9 Appendix 1 ADB Item 8.0 Circulation

Passenger throughput at the airport as stated by BAA gives 2175 per hour. The supposition by SPT of the take-up by potential passengers who might use the link is 10%. The figure derived therefore is 217 per hour and approx 54 every 15 minutes. This assumption is questionable and does not appear to have been based on anything of substance.

However in a letter from SPT, dated 2nd August 2005 (Appendix B) also signed by C Hoskins this figure was specified as being for the year 2030. With a timetable of a train every 7.5 minutes in each direction over an 18 hour day, the year one passenger prediction of 1,400,000 (refer to SPT coloured publicity leaflet issued AFTER the press release on the GARL) will produce a contradictory passenger number of 40 every 15 minutes.

10 Appendix 1 ADB Item 10.0 Ticketing Facilities

Revenue protection (ticket collection) is apparently not required as there will be an occasional ticket checking facility provided. This will not make it easy to estimate or make revenue projections accurately as ALL passengers should be paying a fare, thus minimising any subsidy and increasing revenue. This, combined with Item 3, makes nonsense of any cost estimates on passenger numbers.

11 Main Report page 3 Operational Assessment

Why should the GARL timetable be more robust than the existing one when checked as a mathematical exercise. Why not make the present timetable more robust.
The timetable for the GARL is said to be more robust. How can this statement be justified when the Paisley Signal Control Centre will have to contact Glasgow SCC and request a slot on the line when wishing to send a train on the UP line of the bi directional track.

"Optimism Bias: A tendency to budget for the best possible (often lowest cost) outcome rather than the most likely. This creates a risk that predicted outcomes do not fully reflect likely costs." This definition is taken from the SPT website, Environmental Statement, Volume 2 page 11 of 13.

The Optimism Bias (OB) has been reduced from 44% to 28% although all of the risk assessments that will be required have not been carried out. In particular soil investigations.

Why is the Optimism Bias (OB) calculation now back at 44%, when they have already reduced the figure on the basis of their risk analysis to 28%? Which is correct?

Table 33 now switches back to an Optimism Bias (OB) of 44%. Which is the correct figure to use 44% or 28%? Neither has been used consistently.

Yet again the OB has switched back to 28%. This is a contradiction AFTER using the 44% figure earlier.

Each of the variations in TTRA (Train plan and Timetable Robustness Analyser) has been modelled in isolation as a separate exercise but not as a composite of the twin track with a single rail into Glasgow, so how can this be a useful exercise when it is a mathematical use of algorithms. Thus, how much credence can be put on the statement that the GARL has a ‘robust’ timetable.

There is no reference to the fact that Paisley Signalling Control Centre has to request permission from Glasgow Signalling Control Centre to send a train up the track. (Reference Main report page 72 – 8.4.9.2)
Over a 3 year construction it is ASSUMED that speed restrictions will be available ‘for long periods’ on an already congested rail route. This is before any signal upgrades.

At Wallneuk/Arkleston the Up and Down lines can only operate on opposite direction goods loop for a limited period yet this is considered to be maintaining a ‘robust’ schedule.

The need to DELETE one freight train when 2 overlap illustrates the fraudulent assumptions being made to allow the end result to be achieved.

In Table 3, why is it that a delay of 1 minute is considered to be acceptable even when it is not in compliance with the Rules of the Plan. Yet a 20 second delay, incurred by modifying the route to skirt around St James Park as an option, was described as an ‘against’ factor and found not to be acceptable. Again the figures are being manipulated. (Appendix C)

The timescale is stated as 140 weeks (approx 30 months).

The Microsoft construction barchart shows 33 months.

It is difficult to understand how the commissioning of the project can be completed in 23 months, whilst the Airport Station and Viaduct will not be completed for a further 6 months. It follows that there will have to be a commissioning period AFTER this for the total system, thus extending the timetable.

A statement is made that construction is to take 55 weeks. The Microsoft schedule issued states 392 days which is equal to 78 weeks at 5 days a week, or 65 weeks at 6 days a week.

“Prior to any demolition or excavation work a detailed survey must be undertaken to locate and identify all services that are within and close to the footprint of new works.”

If this detailed survey is required how can the schedule or estimates be in anyway accurate? This is a contradiction to the earlier Stage 2 report which was purported to ‘freeze’ the project costs.
Faber Maunsell state that Stage 2 was presented in January 2005 and in fact sought to define or freeze the costs on the scheme. This ‘freeze’, is a direct contradiction to the statements made by SPT Project Manager at a minuted meeting on 11th August 2005 that “the reports Stage 2 and 3 were still work in progress.” Throughout the Stage 3 report there are multiple references to probable increased costs AFTER the planning approval has been granted.

“thus a 52m long straight is proposed over the M8”,

How can there be 52 metre straight stretch over the M8 when the bridge (according to drawings supplied with the report) has a clear span of 135 metre, with all the drawings showing the bridge on a straight line across the motorway the 52 metre dimension is a contradiction and a measure of engineering incompetence. Which figure is correct and what is the likely impact on the project?

A 1% (1:100) rise over the M8 is in conflict with the station platform being at 1:500. Depending from which end the calculation is made it will affect the height of the bridge over the M8.

(Reference Appendix 1 ADB Section 6 - Platform “Each platform will have a maximum gradient of 1 in 500.”)

“The chemical analysis of the soil samples revealed elevated concentrations of lead, EPH, PAH and xylenes above guideline screening values. Sulphate and pH levels compared against BRE guidance Special Digest 1 ‘Concrete in Aggressive Ground’, classify the site as Design Sulphate Class 2 and ACEC class AC-5z.”

The above quotation is in contradiction to P93 -10.2.6 which states only jet fuel.

Soil contaminations at a point local to the fuel farm will require soil remediation in order to comply with current acceptable soil contamination levels. This will have a cost impact on the project.

“contamination consists of aviation fuel only ie, a single treatment technology is required” (also taken from Page 93 - 10.2.6).

This statement is a direct contradiction to that on Page 41 - 5.3.2. “Contamination testing, for a range of contaminants was undertaken on seven soil samples from three trial pits located on the edge of area currently occupied by the tank farm. The chemical analysis of the soil samples revealed elevated concentrations of lead, EPH, PAH and xylenes above guideline screening values. Sulphate and pH levels compared against BRE guidance Special Digest 1 ‘Concrete in Aggressive Ground’, classify the site as Design Sulphate Class 2 and ACEC class AC-5z.”
Reading the paragraphs following the table, it is noted that the SPT have repeatedly refused in the past to include bus operations in passenger numbers or usage on the basis that they were a private business matter. Why do they use them now? Is it only because it suits their case to include them? Also, why then disallow any inclusion of the bus operators in a future subsidy. This is indeed a 'cherry-picking' of information when it suits the needs or arguments of the SPT.

There is a contradiction in the table by mixing monetary numbers and percentages. Why is there no mention of bus travel or costs, only taxi and car parking in the notes at the bottom of the table?

Figure 9 only makes reference to taxis with no mention of the various bus operators that also service the airport. Is this a case of selective amnesia or just another distortion of the figures?

From drawing number T310D Track Alignment, issued by SPT, the new facing crossover is to be located east of St James Station, not west as stated in the associated text. Obviously no check was made before presentation.

Again the crossover is stated to be located west of the station, not to the east of it.

Sketches issued by SPT in August of the proposed M8 bridge gives a span of 140 m yet the statement on page 43 Section 5.4.4. gives a span of 135 metres. Further on in the same section in item 1, it states the clear span as 140 metres. This is a contradiction which has cost implications depending on which figure is correct. The question of engineering competence is also raised.

During construction there will be less than the stated 11 pitches retained for use and this figure will probably be as low as 5 given the current proposed layout. Refer to Drawing No 39055/ASH/G501 Rev C for the pitches layout.

This is due to the need for access to both sides of the viaduct which crosses the park by a temporary road from the A726 - refer to the section on construction, page 82 – 9.2.7. The amount of land required for erection activities by cranes will also encroach on the remaining playing area.
Once again there is an economy of words and a definite understating of their own conclusions. “The impact of the platform extension at Glasgow Central Station could be accommodated but there were a small number of operational issues still to be resolved.” Reference should be made to P85 – 9.7 Civils. The civil works involved will seriously impact operations in the station.

On Page 3 of the SPT publication ‘where next’ it states that the complex crossing of the White Cart is “technically questionable”. Yet the Master Plan from BAA indicates the requirement for a new exit road which is planned to run eastwards from the terminal across the White Cart onto the M8. (Appendix D)

Also, the construction of the high level White Cart Viaduct on the M8 over the river didn’t seem to pose a problem when the motorway was built, so why is it now a problem as this was an argument used by SPT to dismiss an alternative route.

On Page 4 of the ‘where next’ document the tunnel option entails “poor ground conditions including deep foundations under the M8”. The Dutch have had no problems constructing an underground Metro in ground which is in a poorer condition than St James’ Park.

In contradiction to their statement there are NO deep foundations under the M8 on the proposed route that might need to be tunnelled, only at the St James Interchange and the M8 White Cart River viaduct.

On Page 5 of the ‘where next’ document the elevated option was “not feasible as it would impinge on the Airport Vertical clearance regulations”.

There are NO regulations governing the height of any construction at the airport, according to BAA, only that nothing should be higher than the existing multi-storey hotel. CAA regulations are even more relaxed in terms of height obstructions and restrictions for the airport. This seems to be another inaccurate statement, or is it called deliberate misinformation to improve their case. (Appendix E)

On Page 5 of the ‘where next’ document the park ’n ride would lead to a “costly station structure”. This is a strange comment when C Hopkins has stated that there was never a financial limit placed on the project. Refer to minutes of meeting with SPT held on 20th January 2005. (Appendix F)

In contradiction the current Stage 3 report has a figure of £12,593,000 for the cost of the proposed station. This figure represents 7.9% of the cost of the project. Exactly when does an item become too costly? Is it only when it is used in the context of a Park ’n Ride?

On Page 12 of the ‘where next’ document there are listed potential benefits. In spite of the statement about goods, there will be NO goods moved on the link to or from the airport given the difficulty of accessing the rail station. That is, unless the SPT are proposing to change the route to access Braehead Shopping Centre, which is a benefit they have chosen to ignore.
43 Main Report page 36  Elevated Pedestrian Link

As in Item 46 this view is blocked by the MSCP which is between the 2 buildings?

44 Main Report page 36  Concourse

“For the passenger arriving by train at the Airport, the concourse provides the first opportunity to view the Terminal building”

How can the terminal be visible from the station concourse with the MSCP (Multi Storey Car Park) between them?

45 Appendix 1 ADB Item 7.0  Concourse

No litter bins are to be provided on the Airport Station platform and yet in Item 11 of the above Appendix there is stated to be a newsagent/confectionery kiosk allowed on the concourse. This will cause a litter problem.

46 Appendix 1 ADB Item 9.0  Canopy and Enclosure

Diesel fume extraction is to be by passive means yet the concourse is to be fully enclosed. As there will be train canopies over the platforms, this seems to be a contradiction and will also be a pollution problem.

47 Main Report page 131 - 13.8  Construction Issues

Another contradiction is the accuracy of the construction bar chart when there have been no possessions agreed with any of the stakeholders

48 Main Report page 120  Table 48

If a number is indeterminate it cannot be used in any comparison

**ADDITIONAL COSTS**

Many costs appear to have been overlooked or deliberately ignored. Figures produced are inconsistent or perhaps they have been taken at random with no basis in fact. In either case many of the calculations used are misleading, giving rise to concerns about the final costs.

Some of the text quoted from Faber Maunsell Stage 3 report has been highlighted in red for emphasis and merits careful attention.

49 Appendix 1 ADB - Item 3.0  Ownership

As the ownership of the station has not yet been determined this means that the allocation of costs to maintain it during its life span cannot be calculated. As the BAA did not request the rail link they have made no contribution to the cost of it. This will cause **additional costs**
This gives a positive NPV and states that estimates have been produced yet the 9 outstanding technical issues listed will all most likely produce additional costs.

“• Further development of the Possession Strategy;
• More detailed examination of the construction programme;
• Commissioning of topographical surveys;
• Commissioning of further ground investigation studies;
• Examination of existing structural elements and services and Glasgow Central Station;
• Optimisation of potential synergy with Network Rail Renewals Programme;
• Further development of the use and signalling of the Relief Line;
• Development of design to next stage of technical approval (e.g. Form A); and
• Development of design for enabling works (e.g. new fuel farm, St James Park mitigation).”

There are no economic benefits listed to justify the construction and operating costs. The excessive disruption that is to be avoided on the M8 has not been quantified in the construction method statement. This will lead to additional costs to alleviate the problem.

Network Rail signalling upgrade for the Paisley area will not be finished until 2013. This will incur additional costs for this patchwork of upgrades.

Nowhere is there any mention of the effects of signalling patchwork upgrades having any impact on the timetables or the 2 year construction on the existing timetables. The necessary additional costs are certainly not listed.

No mention is made of the additional cost of protecting the structure against the possible terrorist use of explosives on the steel supporting structure which takes the height of the track to 9.4 meters. The result of this action could cause the station and concourse to collapse and obviously affect the airport.

“The chemical analysis of the soil samples revealed elevated concentrations of lead, EPH, PAH and xylenes above guideline screening values. Sulphate and pH levels compared against BRE guidance Special Digest 1 ‘Concrete in Aggressive Ground’, classify the site as Design Sulphate Class 2 and ACEC class AC-5z.” This is in contradiction to P93 10.2.6 which states only jet fuel.

Soil contaminations at a point local to the fuel farm will require soil remediation to comply with current acceptable contamination levels. This will have additional costs and a probable time impact on the project.
“The soils encountered in the recent ground investigation in the vicinity of Clark Street are highly compressible over a thickness exceeding 11 metres.

These soils will compress over a long period of time making it difficult to control the extent of any settlement along the branch line and in particular between the piled bridge structure, which would display very limited settlement, and the unsupported embankment retained by vertical walls”.

The only piled structure shown on Drawing Number S280 is at the bridge over Clark Street. There are NO piled structures indicated between Clark Street and the main line. This would appear to contradict the statement in the report and therefore will lead to additional costs.

There will be bearings required for the new platform at Glasgow Central in a Grade A listed building undercroft, to compensate for acceleration and braking. At what additional cost?

“The cost of supporting the embankment on piled transfer platform is much greater”.

The costs stated in Stage 2 are no longer adequate and cannot have been reflected in the overall cost for the project. Carlton Die Cast – small bored piles are required and are more expensive. This additional cost is not quantified in Table 8 on page 43, in a comparison with embankment costs. This will now be an additional cost. Also Drg No 39055/MKB/S270 is neither listed nor supplied.

No mention is made of elevating the bridge into place at a height of 9.4 metres during an overnight installation. This is an additional cost, and it will certainly increase the length of closure to the motorway causing major economic disruption.

(Ref Main Report Page 82 - 9.2.8 “forward & then sideways”.)

In further correspondence – dated 15th February letter, reference 39055TGP/04, in reply to questions raised on their letter 1826 Item 7.3.4.5 – they detail the method of installation. It means that the time of 12 hours that has been continuously promoted is not feasible and incorrect when the amount of work to be undertaken is set against a timetable. This will certainly increase the time the M8 will be totally disrupted and also incurring delays to the schedule. (Appendix G).
60 Main Report Page 82 - 9.2.8  M8 Crossing

Item above states ‘forward & then sideways’. There is no mention that this has to be carried out at a height of 9.4 metres (31 ft) in elevation. From enquiries within the industry it has been discovered that this has never been attempted before. Surely this requires a risk analysis and method statement which has not been carried out?

What will be the additional costs to the project from this? In addition there will a time schedule impact on time and motorway closure. Refer also to Number 59

61 Main Report Page 58 - 7.3  Structural Design

Again major modifications are proposed to a Grade A listed building and to properties affected in Argyle St. All these supplementary construction costs have not been estimated fully and incorporated in the total cost. There are no details available.

62 Main Report Page 58 - 7.3.2  Information Received

NO existing records are available from Network Rail on the Central Station to assess the required engineering content and from that the construction costs that this work scope for modifying the station has not been costed with any accuracy. Additional costs are therefore more than likely.

63 Main Report Page 59 - 7.3.4  Undercroft

Again there are no engineering records available for the Central Station so a GUESS has been made on costs and appraisal of any time schedule impact. Again additional costs are therefore more than likely.

64 Main Report Page 59 - 7.3.5  Services

Again there are no detail engineering records on the station so a GUESS has been made on costs and appraisal of any time schedule impacts.

More details will be required AFTER the planning application is approved leading inevitably to increased costs for the GARL.

65 Main Report Page 60 - 7.4.3  Circulation and Access

There is no mention of the provision of a service to allow disabled access to the platforms. Is this yet another Larkhall or will this lead to increased costs AFTER planning approval has been granted?

66 Main Report Page 63 - 8.2.8  OLE General

Here again is the potential for cost increases. A detailed geotechnical soil investigation will be required AFTER approval is granted. There has been no statement on cost for this item.
If the re-interlocking limits are not presently understood, how can anything be remotely estimated as an item for inclusion in the cost structure? This will also cause increased costs AFTER approval is given.

“As Network Rail has not yet finally decided on a technology for re-signalling the Glasgow Central area, it is currently not possible to recommend provision of equipment in line with their choice”.

The potential for additional cost increases are identified should Network Rail in the near future decide to change the standards adopted at present AFTER the GARL has been approved. This will mean additional costs.

The specification for the trains has not been defined. There is then much potential for a cost increase once this has been determined, following approval.

If the construction plan is to be believed the project duration will not be 33 months. This is demonstrated by the fact that the Airport Link Structure finishes 8 months AFTER the Commissioning of the Works and the Branch Line 6 months AFTER the Commissioning. Following this construction the whole system will have to be commissioned again as an integrated system. This again will cause cost increases as well as an extension to time for the project.

It is stated that the road level will require to be lowered 300 mm to retain existing clearance. There is no mention of moving the medium and low pressure gas lines in the area of the bridge, but this lowering of the road surface will reduce the present cover and make the new depth a safety issue. Indeed, it is not shown on the construction barchart nor have the extra costs involved been allowed for.

The movement of 20 m (65.5 ft) long steel girders by road to the site has not been examined although 40 ft articulated lorries already have a problem negotiating corners in the area at present. If they are required to be transported in shorter lengths and assembled onsite then this will add to construction costs AFTER approval is given.

The movement of 25m (82 ft) long steel girders by road to the site as in No. 29 has not been examined. Perhaps they will be built locally and if so where? If they are required to be transported in shorter lengths and assembled onsite then this will add to construction costs AFTER approval is given.
The movement of 28m (92 ft) long steel girders by road to the site has not been examined. If they are required to be transported in shorter lengths and assembled onsite then this will add to construction costs AFTER approval is given.

Prior to any demolition or excavation work a detailed survey must be undertaken to locate and identify all services that are within and close to the footprint of new works. This work is likely to involve inspection of records, radar or similar non-intrusive survey techniques and hand dug trial pits. On identification of services measures should be taken to relocate all affected utilities. From the study undertaken to date no arches have been identified as being unable to accommodate current loading conditions. However, very little information has been obtained and the prospect of no strengthening for provision of the addition GARL track work must be assumed an optimistic ‘best case’ scenario. With removal of the car ramp deck and imposition of train loading along the line of the ramp new forces will be induced onto the elements of ramp and deck abutments that are to be retained. This may affect the integrity of the adjacent arches and could lead to progressive collapse within the undercroft unless compensatory restraint is provided. Such restraint would need to be in place before demolition works commence.

Strengthening and/or refurbishment of the retaining walls in order to accommodate the new track support deck is also likely to be required. The form and extent of strengthening works will be dependent on the capacity of the existing walls but these cannot be determined at this stage as no details of the 1980’s construction have been made available and hence a structural assessment has not been possible. Design will have to take account of both temporary and permanent loading requirements but it would be hoped the temporary works could be incorporated as part of the permanent redecking works. Foundations to the station arch entrance could be undermined as the existing platform between is excavated. Again further investigation is required into the depth of footings and their means of lateral support.

The only concern is the quantity of extra costs to be determined and added AFTER the planning approval once all of the above has been resolved in engineering terms.

“The Permanent Way layouts are based on 2D Ordnance Survey Tiles the effect of cant and differences in levels has therefore not been considered.”

This will have an impact on the construction programme. Being a successive and progressive operation it will have an impact on duration with an escalation in costs caused by the extension of time.

Again there is no mention of compliance in the gradients for safety, maintenance and signalling in accordance with Network Rail requirements.
77 Main Report Page 87 - 9.11.1 Glasgow Re-signalling

“As stated previously Network Rail has not yet finally decided on a technology or re-signalling the Glasgow Central area, it is currently not possible to recommend provision of equipment in line with their choice. Solid state interlocking (SSI) does provide a possible alternative technology for this scheme, although without undertaking replacement over a wider geographical area, particularly at Shields Junction, the boundaries with the existing equipment would be very complicated.”

If this statement is correct how can an estimate of costs be anywhere near accurate and how much additional cost will this item add to the project AFTER planning approval.

78 Main Report Page 87 - 9.11.2 Portals

Interface with Network Rail OLE Renewal (Shields – Gourock OLE Renewal)...... The outcome of these discussions was that NR (Network Rail) rejected this proposal.”

If they cannot obtain agreement with Network Rail on this basic point how can they make any meaningful estimate far less produce a meaningful schedule?

What will be the impact on the project costs of this proposal AFTER approval is granted.

79 Main Report Page 89 - 9.12.4 Central Station Railway Systems

“In the second category, 3 No 28 hour possession will be required of platform 11A and the surrounding platforms to bring the new platform into use, install the new P/Way, alter the OLE and Signalling Control Panel at Glasgow Central Signal box. Any change to shorter possessions would require more possessions and therefore incur additional costs to the project.”

If this is necessary, leading to increased costs, why was the Optimism Bias Reduced by 16%? This action will also affect the construction schedule leading to increased costs AFTER the approval is given.
“However, there are considerable risks associated with major works on an operational railway, and costs will be heavily dependent upon the finally adopted programme and construction methods used, rather than those which have been proposed as the basis for the estimate.”

This statement gives rise to some apprehension that in spite of all the detailed work done they still cannot be certain that there is a definitive estimate for the project to date, or even if it is within the OB (Optimism Bias) of 28%.

“Where only limited record information of existing assets (eg structures) affected by GARL has been obtained, best professional judgement has been used to establish likely works and their associated costs.”

This is said in spite of having NO engineering records relating to the undercroft work at Central Station. **Additional costs** can be expected as a result of this statement, **AFTER** approval has been granted.

The ownership of the station has yet to be decided. If BAA gets ownership, how much financial input are they likely to provide and will they also accept the costs of maintenance of the station and the landscaping provided.

The **additional costs** related to decommissioning the old Fuel Farm, building and commissioning the new fuel farm are missing from Table 15. The associated soil remediation **costs** which could be considerable are also missing from this table.

“Land, Compensation and Mitigation is £13,146,000.”

No land, apart from a couple of hundred meters at Murray Street Business Park is specified to justify paying out this sum of money.
Other Cost Allowances £17,020,000. This figure amounts to **30% of the sub total**.

Land and Compensation £1,000,000  
Sub-total £4,075,000  
Other Cost Allowances £1,752,000

The ‘Other Cost Allowance’ amounts to **42.9% of the sub total**.

Other Cost Allowances £35,461,000  
Sub-total £124,895,000

In this Summary the ‘Other Cost Allowances’ amounts to **28.3% of the sub total**.

There is a considerable discrepancy in the percentage allowance in these tables. We are talking of a total “allowance” of approx £54 m. Surely we should expect more detailed accountability of what £54 m is to be spent on and not just “other allowances”. This is too vague and very suspicious.

The total annual cost:

Annual Maintenance Costs £696,700  
Renewal Costs £191,000  
Operating Costs £4,163,000  
£5,050,700

In ‘where next,’ page 16, the annual total costs to run the GARL are stated to be £3,000,000. This document was only issued on January 2005. Why is there such a large increase of 68% in such a short time?
In the text following Table 26 it states a fare of £3.30 single.

A taxi with 4 people at a cost £13.50 can travel from door to door or to/from the Airport a road distance of 11 miles. The cost for 4 passengers for the GARL is £13.20 and this only takes them to Glasgow Central Station.

No potential airport user would want to drag luggage from say Partick, with the hassle of getting to Central station. When travelling on business or going on holiday, no sensible traveller subjects themselves to all the hassle and time involved in using the proposed multiple modes of transport – bus/car/taxi – to Central Station, then take a train to the airport and finish by using the travelator to check in – carrying luggage when one taxi journey or a lift from a friend would get one to the terminal much more quickly and at a reasonable price, in the case of a taxi. Anyone who is not able to access the Central station easily, or who has to travel from Renfrew, Kilbarchan, Houston, Elderslie etc has no choice but to use private transport or taxi. A business man has no interest in using the GARL as he will be on company expenses and wants to minimize hassle and travel to his destination as quickly as possible, usually by taxi. There are also the extra costs of travelling to/from the Central Station which obviously adds to the costs, making the train less attractive.

If this fare should be reduced it would then necessitate an increase in subsidy.

This proves the GARL will never be used to its full potential. (Appendix H)

The Optimism Bias calculation is now back at 44%, when they have already reduced the figure on the basis of risk analysis to 28% and shown the total costs of the project as being based on 28%.

The assumption is made that the maintenance costs will be covered by operating costs when the breakdown is made in Tables 22 to 24. These are 2 distinct cost centres attributable to different sources and therefore not compatible.

The latter part of this section makes comment of the need for a subsidy of £62,800,000. It is assumed that this will be annual although it is not stated. Also there is a mix of time, accidents and costs, in Table 36, yet a total is given, how can these be reconciled?

With the need to make a cost allowance for maintenance costs, along with operational costs and a contribution to renewal costs, the annual figure in total is £67,850,700 (above figure plus £5,050,700 from Table 24). All this for a possible passenger load, as a maximum of 20 per train, each of which is capable of carrying 393 people, depending on which numbers of total passenger usage, provided by SPT, are used.
The sensitivity tests did not take account of the increased signalling requirements of 6 tph (trains per hour) that the GARL would require should 2 extra trains be run to Ayrshire.

**Extra costs** will be incurred in designing the signaling system to suit.

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a) In the text following the table it is stated that the trains will be ‘procured’ when in an earlier statement on operating costs it is stated they will be leased. (Refer to Table 24 on page 99 and Table 36 on page 109). This is therefore an unknown cost at present, but one which will fundamentally alter all figures for the project in terms of operating, maintenance and capital costs.

This is a totally different cost structure and impact. Which is correct and when will the **additional costs** be made public?

b) The operating costs increase by 25% but the increase in subsidy is 37.8%. This does not make sense.

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The grant/subsidy payment is shown to **increase** by 14.9% against the figure used for a rate of growth for air passenger numbers that is supposed to be half of that specified by the DfT (Department of Transport).

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The PVB (Present Value of Benefit) reduces by £9,800,000 when the fare between Paisley Gilmour St and the Airport rises by 15%, yet the subsidy only reduces by £4,400,000 approximately 7.0%. This seems to be more doctoring of figures to suit.

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With the service increasing to 6 tph (trains per hour) 50%, the subsidy has an increase of 53%. Why then does the PVB in this scenario, only increase by 4.7%. Is there a correlation?

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Why is the statement made that the “case is strengthened” when that is totally contradicted by Table 42 which states the **subsidy increases** to £134,500,000 and the operating and maintenance costs also increase by £81,700,000 whilst the revenue only rises by £7,500,000.

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There are references to the revenues from highway tolls. The only tolls locally are at the Erskine Bridge used by motorists travelling to the Airport from the north side of the Clyde. The inclusion of this statement amounts to a smokescreen.
There are to be surface water drains alongside the viaduct. The Scottish Office has attempted on 2 occasions to alleviate the flooding of the pitches by use of Field Drains but with little success.

Also the Scottish Water plans for the area only indicate one 300 mm diameter waste water main, running the length of Greenock Road to service the 23 houses alongside the park.

There is only one outfall shown from the viaduct across St James’ Park to the waste water pipe in Greenock Road on Drawing Number T230 A1-F. This will not be sufficient and there will be additional costs for extra drainage. There may be flooding of the park as a result of this omission.

There are to be no litter bins provide on the platforms, (refer to section 11). This will incur additional cost for cleaning services as there is to be a kiosk/tobacconists on the concourse.

There is to be NO revenue protection. This statement means no staff will be in attendance. This will incur additional cost of non-paying passengers arriving from abroad assuming a free service, or locals who will take a chance by travelling free if only to Paisley.

Reference is made to tolls. This is a very vague statement and sounds like a red herring.

Yet again NO risk assessment will be undertaken until AFTER the project has received approval. Why has this not already been carried out? By waiting until AFTER approval this will be an additional cost to the project. Remember, the project at Holyrood also refused to take account of any extra costs relating to risk assessment.
PASSENGER NUMBERS

We feel that SPT’s projected passenger numbers do not/will not justify a rail link, as shown below.

BAA passenger projection figures are used. Surely for a project of this magnitude their own primary research should have been done instead of using secondary information.

Table 25 relates only to airport passengers and employees. In the report by BAA, (Glasgow Airport outline Master Plan dated July 2005) a passing mention is made on page 23 that, should the rail link not go ahead only a small increase in car parking spaces will be required. Obviously BAA does not have much confidence in the number of people likely to use the GARL.

On page 28 - 7.2.6 of the BAA Report the current public transport mode of 11% is projected to increase to 12% with the existing bus services. There is no mention of rail as a mode of transport.

On the same page 28 (Rail), the statement is made that BAA “still await the transport modeling work to understand the scale of improvements” This statement is hardly a ringing endorsement of the need for a rail link. (Appendix I)

On page 29 of the same report by BAA (Glasgow Airport Outline Master Plan) they quote from the relevant White Paper, that it refers only to the benefits of road upgrades to accommodate Braehead, Renfrew etc. (Refer to Appendix D)

Nowhere in the plan is there any survey, assessment or projection of passenger usage of the proposed rail link, or even an assumed percentage in passenger terms of those likely to make use of it. All passenger numbers are based on BAA airport numbers with a wrong assumption that those numbers will make use of the rail link. All passenger numbers are based on BAA airport numbers with an assumption that those numbers will make use of the rail link when, in fact, no work or modelling has done to substantiate this assumption. This is an assumption which is fundamental to justify the business case for the whole project and expenditure of the project budget figure.

Edinburgh’s inner city tram system passenger figure take up, is being used as a basis of assumption for a heavy twin track rail opening year profile? There cannot be any comparison between the 2 systems. This is because of the differing passenger type, ie passengers going on holiday with heavy luggage against people commuting about town for short journeys.

We question the basis on which assumptions of highway decongestion benefits of 100% and 75% are used, when no actual survey of airport passengers is provided? These figures are a mathematical speculation and supposition.
There is no qualification or clarification of how the numbers presented in the table were arrived at.

The total number of trips on the GARL, mysteriously appears from nowhere without explanation and in addition have been taken at 100% when in section 12.2.5 the ramp up was assumed to be 75%. Again, this is an example of cherry picking the numbers to suit.

The statement is made that the GARL will account for 40% of the usage at the airport. This is given without explanation as the mathematics illustrated on the table does not make sense when trying to arrive at the figure of 40%.

There is no sensible basis or explanation given for the assessment of 20% of passengers likely to transfer from private car to GARL.

This is so full of assumptions and assertions that it should be disregarded and SPT made to resubmit the tables founded in facts, so as to make it worth reading.

It is assumed that bus passengers will switch to GARL but there is no allowance made for interchange delay. Many potential travellers will wish to continue their journey by bus from Glasgow’s Buchanan St Bus Station and this would be best achieved by bus from the airport instead of using the GARL which would mean a change at Glasgow Central station, then a walk or yet another bus link to Buchanan Street Bus Station.

The assumption that the increase in passenger numbers could not be accommodated in car park spaces is wrong. It has not been researched at all or it would have been found that BAA are planning long term car parking outwith the airport. There has also been another new car parking facility opened near St James Interchange along with an additional one in Well Street, which is now expanding, all of which are expecting to make a profit.

The table presents a case for a lower growth rate in air passenger numbers than that 'guesstimated' without quantifying the amount or the reduction. This cannot be perceived as a “benefit”.
The worst case scenario does not consider that there is the possibility of NO-ONE using the GARL.

They quote an expectancy of 1,400,000 passenger journeys in the first year. They ignore the fact that this will, at most, be 20 passenger journeys per train during this time.

Given this scenario there requires to be a budget included for the removal of the spur from St James’ Park in order not make the viaduct a derelict structure or an environmental scar across the Park which is likely to become the reality.

The latest publicity leaflet issued by SPT following the press release on the GARL submission to the Private Bills Unit states 1,400,000 passengers “in the year of opening” between Glasgow Central, Paisley and the Airport. This amounts to no more than 20 people per train which is designed to carry 393 passengers on the stated timetable. This figure also does not represent airport users exclusively, as it includes the normal passenger travel between Glasgow Central and Paisley Gilmour St. At best it will serve only to increase the frequency of service to Paisley and do nothing for the airport.

Refer to Appendix 1 ADB, page 2 of 4, Section 6 - Platforms “Each 4 car unit can accommodate a maximum of 247 seated passengers (64-64-55-64) plus 146 standing passengers totalling 393 passengers at capacity.”

TECHNICAL/SAFETY/OPERATIONAL

The third rail line being bi–directional will result in increased complexity of the signalling required on a system which is not due to be completely overhauled until 2013 according to Network Rail.

Should the existing timetable be made more robust with regard to making the freight trains run with greater punctuality, this would prevent the need of having to justify the GARL timetable. It would also be of more benefit to the network than the GARL.

If, in the Operational Assessment, the GARL timetable is said to be more robust WHY would the Paisley Signal Control Centre need to REQUEST a slot on the Up line from Glasgow SCC and then wait for permission to do so. Surely this is a retrograde step. Refer to Page 72 – 8.4.9.2.
The timescale is stated as 140 weeks (approx 30 months). Microsoft construction bar chart shows 33 months. The commissioning is shown as being complete yet the airport station and viaduct are not completed until 6 months later. It follows that there will have to be yet another commissioning period AFTER this for the total system, thus extending the timetable. This omission amounts to misrepresenting the schedule to reduce the project duration.

Does this mean yet another derogation* to allow a radius of 150m approaching the station? If so this is a serious SAFETY question.

If the re-interlocking limits are not presently understood, how can anything be estimated for inclusion in the cost structure?

It also begs the question why, if the transport consultants cannot understand what is going on, what is the level of their competence?

Item states “forward & then sideways”. There is no mention that it has to be at a height of 9.5 metres (31 ft). This will present an increase in costs and an increase in the time allocated for the closure of the M8.

“Interface with Network Rail OLE Renewal (Shields – Gourock OLE Renewal)….The outcome of these discussions was that NR (Network Rail) rejected this proposal.”

If they cannot obtain agreement with Network Rail on this basic point on OLE renewals, how can they make any meaningful estimate far less produce a meaningful schedule? Were there any alternative proposals made to NR that they accepted?

There are 6 piers, each taking a duration of 5 weeks for each of 3 road crossings.

How much disruption will this cause BAA passengers using road access? As this is not mentioned perhaps we are once again being kept in the dark until later.

There is no scheduled activity for the building and commissioning of the new Fuel Farm prior to the decommissioning and removal of the existing Fuel Farm on the Microsoft construction schedule.

* The dictionary definition of derogation states “to deviate in standard: to curtail the application of a law: debase or degrade.”
What is meant by “the works duration increasing 20%”? Is this statement made to hide an extension to the project overall duration. (Appendix J)

No mention is made of the borehole commissioned on the north side of the M8 which will support the rail bridge foundations. Verbal comments by a SPT representative stated that the depth of boring was stopped at 47 meters. (Appendix K)

What proposals were put forward for the strengthening of the undercroft that would allow the costs to be developed when there is no detailed existing information on which to base a sensible estimate? Refer to Page 85 – 9.7  Civils

There has been no account taken of the M74 completion that is intended to alleviate and improve the congestion on the M8 at both the Kingston Bridge and the airport.

There is no indication on the drawings supplied that the necessary gradients off the junction to the Airport are in compliance with Network Rail safety requirements for signalling. (Appendix L)

The line of LLAU (Limits of Land Acquired or Used) would appear to encroach on the main electrical sub-station building.

Does this mean that the electrical sub-station is also to be moved and at what cost to the project and disruption to the airport?

Why is there no concern shown in the text for the construction of the viaduct being so close to the sub station, yet there is concern at the Carlton Die Works which would appear to be located at a greater distance from the rail line.

On Page 8 of the ‘where next’ document there is the comment that Option A would have an environmental risk on the Paisley Moss Nature Reserve. In spite of this remark they now plan to relocate and rebuild the existing Fuel Farm to within 15 metres of the reserve boundary totally ignoring the hazards caused by seepage and/or leaks from the Fuel Farm into the Paisley Moss.

There is a new location shown for the Fuel Farm. Has planning permission been granted by Renfrew Council as the farm is stated to be within 15 metres of the Paisley Moss – a conservation area and local nature reserve?
On Drawing Number 39055/ASH/G501 Rev C

The ball stop fence is shown as running the length of the viaduct on both sides. How will the footballers be accommodated as this will prevent movement across the park from the pavilion to the other pitches other than requiring a long walk around the park on the A726. Perhaps the drawings should be made more accurate.

In regard to the number of football pitches available during the construction of the GARL, once again SPT are issuing contradictory statements. In a letter ref TP1036/1/02E/1826LDG dated 30th August 2005 they state that “the equivalent number of pitches.... will be available at all times”. However in the Stage 3 report page 82 - 9.2.7 states there will be a further loss of pitches due to construction methods in the Park. (Appendix M)
SUMMARY

136 The proposed route across St James' Park will cause excessive noise and vibration to all residents who reside along the route which because of the elevation will be very difficult to combat over the proposed 18 hour timetable.

All residents that overlook the Park will have the very open outlook that they enjoy at present destroyed.

They will also have to endure a high level of construction noise and disruption over a period in excess of 12 months for no permanent gain to the local community.

137 Why have so many people in Faber Maunsell signed off page 2 whilst no one in SPT highlighted or noted the concerns, contradictions and potential cost increases that can be quantified as well as the additional costs predicted to happen following planning approval?

This means leaving the increases to be developed by a contractor, thus adding to his profit as an extra to his estimate or a change to the contract brief. It seems that nothing has been learned from the mess at Holyrood.

138 In the latest SPT publicity leaflet a representative is attributed with saying that the “airport link….will create jobs in the area” It is evident that he has not read the report commissioned by SPT from R Tym and Partners and their summary which is in contradiction to the numbers continuously expounded by the SPT. (Appendix N)

139 According to a letter from SPT on 2nd August 2005 (refer to Appendix B) Faber Maunsell, the author of this report, is “an internationally renowned civil engineering consulting firm” who should have checked their work before submitting it to SPT. They in turn should have at least read the report in full before submitting it to the Scottish Parliament. It is obvious from the multitude of comments, contradictions and potential cost increases that this elementary exercise was not carried out.

This should be a matter of grave concern to all taxpayers since it highlights gross incompetence by the consultants and their client.

140 How much more negligence will occur before the project can be completed and at what horrendous cost to us all.

141 Further to a review of all the published information that has been researched by Faber Maunsell or issued by Weber Shandwick it is evident that the most basic of research, such as a visit, has not been carried out with regard to the ground at St James’ Park. Following our visit to the British Geological Society in Edinburgh and with the generous help of the staff in the library a copy of a map - document number 25302 - showing the extent of the Fireclay Mine Workings and the level of depth that they are at under the park in 1914 was obtained. (Appendix O)
The location of boreholes undertaken by the SPT along the route, do not encroach on any area within the park that might have encountered the mine workings. The depth of approx 45 metres to bedrock does not give confidence that any piling across the Park will be stable enough to prevent the embankment subsiding given the range of depth and scope the workings are to be found at. This subsidence would cause considerable costly repairs and render the spur useless, apart from being a major safety item.

This will inevitably mean a severe increase in costs after planning approval has been granted along with the extension of the programme to overcome the problem.

Signed

Donald Marshall
Chair
Strathclyders Against Detrimental Development
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